The National Human Rights Commission conducted a book review in collaboration with the interfaith program study, postgraduate school, University of Gadjahmada and Islamic and Democracy Study Centre (PUSA) Paramadia on Wednesday (19/6). In that opportunity, the Vice Chair of the National Human Rights Commission, Pramono Ubaid stated during a book launch of conflict management and religious freedom that the old constitution and amendments brought progress to religious freedom, but there remained issues in implementation. This was evident at the level of Constitutional Court decisions and in the regions. These issues were responsible for the regression in the freedom of religion and in democracy in Indonesia.
Government’s actions on religious groups were often ambiguous. The National Human Rights Commission were often busy dealing with religious places and religious freedom. The Law Enforcement Agencies often used joint regulations, but not the values laid out in the constitutions. For Pramono, the joint regulations created many obstacles. The first was administrative in nature, in terms of a requirement to get a consent from the community, and a consent from the followers. The second was theological in nature – a requirement to obtain a permit from the Interfaith Forum. One religious group may have obtained consent at one level, but faced challenges on another level. The third obstacle was political in nature – whether the process affected political choices, particularly during election period. “If my vote counts do not become bigger, why bother giving the permit?”
The different levels of obstacle affected solution – meaning that one needed to see clearly which obstacles was most urgent to address. This influenced the approach that the National Human Rights Commission used.
The book review featured a National Human Rights Commission counselor, Kurniasari Novita Dewi, as a moderator. She invited a resource person to speak, Zainal Abidin Bagir, the director of ICRS, one of the writers. Zainal suggested that the book marked 20 years of advocacy for freedom of religion by the Indonesia Consortium for Religious Studies (ICRS) and Gadjah Mada University. The main point was that there was new development in the advocacy approach worth noting, analysing and discussing.
The Book “Conflict Management, Freedom of Religion started with a background in advocacy history by showcasing two cases. The first was a specific yet controversial case relating to the Indonesian Protestant Church (GKI) Yasmin. The second was a mediation by the National Human Rights Commission. The two cases inhered many issues. The two main case studies and two chapters of the book that followed were theoretical reflection. It talked about the history of the cases, particularly of the history of advocacy for freedom of religion in Indonesia. This was not new. It had been around for two decades - twenty years may be short, but it may also be long. The point was that the history started with the amendment of the 1945 Constitution after the political reform.
The question then was how many activists including lawyers were involved in the issue, by using specific language of freedom of religion since 2005. Then many cases were brought to the court: including attack on Ahmadiyah and other cases. Not all of them may have been new cases, yet freedom of religion was featured with new consciousness, then there were new regulations, all of whom about management of religion in Indonesia. Then there were Ahmadiyah case, and Samang case. There were many cases revolving around religious buildings, not just churches. Studies were then conducted of the most well-known.
To date, when the criminal code became official, some perspectives of freedom of religion were included, indicating that the ICRS had a history and a study and analysis could be done of its two decades of experience. There were discussion and table about meetings of religious leaders-freedom-of-religion activists. There were practices and advocacy on religious freedom in Indonesia - legal in nature involving litigation, preparation of law and advocacy for specific cases. There were also progress in advocacy for freedom of religion, with many survivors becoming activists advocating not only for their own community. There were also capacity building being done.
Then what strategies had been used? In essence, we could see the following: the target of fights for freedom of religion was to change State’s and other actors’ behavior, substituting pressures into resistance, collaboration with the State by participating in preparing laws or by engaging certain communities.
A number of patterns came up in the first chapter: the ambiguity of landscape after the political reform in 1998, so there had to be formal guarantee for political strengthening, but also for giving space for religious people, including people who made it difficult for others to practice their religion freely. Second, there was a trend of making religious conflicts into a judicial issue. There were religious people who experienced religious conflicts, but this was then made into a judicial issue by making it legal – i.e. the Ahmadiyah and Syiah cases which had a long history in Indonesia, including a history of tension. They were being discriminalised or marginalized by using the law or regulation – including issues about religious building even when religious building had been around since 1960s.
The director of PUSAD Paramadina, Ihsan Ali Fauzi stated that the fights for freedom of religion had to continue despite its sensitive nature. This involved advocacy but also careful study in order to identify better strategies – hence a systematic study as was done by Zainal Abidin Bagir.
Ihsan’s writing focused on mediation measures by the National Human Rights Commission. IT was not only about freedom of religion, but also managing sectarian conflicts involving violence, particularly against Ahmadiyah.
He suggested that sectarian conflicts in reform era caused one death. It had never happened before. There were cases in Cikesik and Sampang, in 2012 and 2013. It was however the first time in history that somebody died in the conflict. This was when mediation became a central point for conflict resolution.
Mediation may be a better strategy than legal battle. Everyone knew, however, that mediation was often misunderstood, misused – forcing smaller groups to agree with larger groups. This is by no means “harmony”, but “subjugation.” Mediation happened with the police presence. Mediation was worth studying, because otherwise it would be misunderstood and misused. Furthermore, the National Human Rights Commission had the intention to conduct mediation since the beginning, but could only start it in 2010 with a Standard Operation for Mediation. Once again, the National Human Rights Commission was already integrating mediation into actions to strengthen human rights.
What were the issues associated with religious freedom which the National Human Rights Commission mediated? PUSAD gave more details, what to do, when to do as a form of success, when and when not to attain peace. The study collected all documentation of the National Human Rights Commission from 2012-2020 through interviews with commissioners and other parties done by the Commission.
In discussion on human rights mediation concept and community concept, there used to be a distinction between justice and peace. The misconception was due to comparison between justice and peace (in emergency context). There was synergy between human rights promotion and public transparency. The definition of human rights was expanded in literature on human rights. In the end, there were four human rights domain. They were human rights as norm, human rights as infrastructure, human rights as relation (not just vertical, but also horizontal), and human rights as a process (power relations, structural imbalance). The expansion of meaning opened possibilities for mediation. Human rights associated with freedom of religion could also be mediated because human implemented and interpreted religion. One key success to mediation: the identity of mediator which was related to mandate, resources and motivation (roles as National Human Rights Commission). General mediation and community mediation: National Human Rights Commission as community mediator (involved mediation).
The experience of National Human rights Commission included a section on the mediation of sectarian conflict: triggered by opinions about illegal sects. There were 23 cases (21 from complain submission, Ahmadiyah (including Ahmadiyah mosque: 12 and 23), Syiah (4 cases), others 7 cases. Ahmadiyah conflict was triggered by the Joint Decision by three ministers on Ahmadiyah (2008), which was ambiguous and could be interpreted in many different ways. It did not prohibit Ahmadiyah: but members of Ahmadiyah were not allowed to spread their religion. (1) generally closures of mosques, (2) expulsion and threats of expulsion, and (3) prohibition on conducting activities.
On another note, mediasi of Ahmadiyah case did not resolve: (1) prayer outside of a mosque, (2) the seal was open, but this case happened again and again (the success had to do with administrative services, Manislor case).
• The sub-national governments welcomed the mediation by the National Human Rights Commission in general, but there were public opinion nonetheless.
• The National Human Rights Commission faced structural challenges from two regulations: Joint Ministerial Regulation in 2006 re. Religious Buildings, and Joint Decision by three ministers re. Ahmadiyah (2008) re. sectarian social conflict: (1) more intensive in addressing conflicts re. religious buildings than the second cases (public opinion) : (2) stronger rejection to Ahmadiyah compared to similar rejection to Syiah.
• Mediation on religious building was more successful than mediation on sectarian conflicts: (1) the two have different political significance and different influence on public opinion, and (2) Ahmadiyah-related conflict is more difficult to mediate (successful for administrative services).
• In general, the sub-national governments welcomed the mediation by the National Human Rights Commission, despite the lack of clarity about its outcome, (1) other parties were likely to listen to the National Human Rights Commission (with its mandate), despite its limitations, (2) the sub-national governments could make use of the National Human Rights Commission mandate to strengthen their bargaining power against public opinion that are hostile to human rights.
• There were a small number of cases relating to religious freedom and all of these cases were from complaints: (1) victims needed to report, (2) the need for training on complain submission in campuses.
The Questions
A questioner from Ahmadiyah points out that the book does not provide much details about the Ahmadiyah conflict, because Ahmadiyah did not only report to the National Human Rights Commission, but also to the Women’s Rights Commission, Ombudsman, and the Witness and Victim Protection Agency when a number of its members became witnesses to the Sintang case. It also reported to the Judiciary Commission and the Prosecutor Commission regarding a number of issues relating to the judges’ actions. The questioner appreciates the National Human Rights Commission for their immediate actions on the report and for a number of cases being addressed through mediation.
In Surabaya, the questioner faced delay in extending the permit, although mediation became a vital tool to finally get the permit. There was certainty a vital support and decisiveness by the Ombudsman to support the case. Ombudsman called Risma to come to Jakarta. Risma sent a representative on the first and second calls. The Ombudsman then issued an ultimatum to Risma on the third call to come in person. The meeting was truly peaceful because it respect Ahmadiyah with good faith. There was a legal opinion presented by Airlangga University, which was attached to the submission to the National Human Rights Commission, and became a referral for the latter and which was crucial for obtaining the land-use permit in Surabaya.
In Jambi case, the mediator was Sandra Moniaga whom Ahmadiyah believe is known to be a decisive person. At the governor’s office, the party being mediated used an MUI decision that could not be used. It was not possible for one party to use one referral that was not consistent with given standard. (Ast)
